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This case arises from an order entered by Administrative District Judge Melissa Moody 
of the Fourth Judicial District on November 6, 2017 finding Mark Colafranceschi to be a 
vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59.  (R. at 451-460.)  Mr. Colafranceschi 
now appeals that order.  
Mr. Colafranceschi’s central allegation is that Judge Moody’s order is unfair because other 
people who have been declared vexatious litigants have engaged in more egregious behavior than 
his; her determination that he is a vexatious litigant focused on conduct in one case as opposed to 
multiple; and Judge Moody purportedly either disregarded or improperly weighed evidence in 
reaching her decision.   
None of these arguments establish that Judge Moody abused her discretion. Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 59(d) allows an administrative judge to declare a person to be a vexatious 
litigant if they find that person has engaged in any one of four categories of conduct.  The category 
applied by Judge Moody in this case is subsection (3), which prohibits three types of conduct: (1) 
repeatedly filing unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers; (2) conducting unnecessary 
discovery; and (3) engaging in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay.  
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).  Engaging in this conduct “[i]n any litigation” is sufficient to 
support a vexatious litigant determination.  Id.  In his divorce proceeding, Mr. Colafranceschi 
propounded 380 discovery requests, which included requests for information related to his ex-
wife’s sexual history and whether she had been raped by her ex-husband.  (See R. at 456 (citing 
Aff. of Scott Ludwig Ex 8, at 3, 6, Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, No. CV 2016-125-C (Valley Cty.).)  
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When she declined to respond, Mr. Colafranceschi filed several motions to compel.  (Id.) 
Judge Moody found the discovery requests unnecessary and frivolous, and the subsequent 
motions to compel answers likewise unmeritorious.  (Id.)  She properly applied the plain language 
of Rule 59 to Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct in reaching her determination.  (Id.)  Mr. 
Colafranceschi’s belief that he did not behave badly enough to justify the entry of a prefiling order 
does not mean that Judge Moody acted outside the boundaries of her discretion in doing so.  In 
her order, Judge Moody expressly acknowledged the gravity of a vexatious litigant finding, but 
determined Mr. Colafranceschi’s behavior was sufficient to warrant the entry of a prefiling order 
nonetheless.  (Id. at 455-57.) 
For the foregoing reasons set forth in greater detail below, this Court should affirm Judge 
Moody’s vexatious litigant determination and uphold the prefiling order. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Colafranceschi has been involved in a divorce proceeding with his former spouse, 
Julie Neustadt, since a petition for divorce was filed on May 6, 2016.  (R. at 66 (citing Petition 
for Divorce, Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, No. CV 2016-125-C (Valley Cty. May 6, 2016)). 
On March 16, 2017, counsel for Ms. Neustadt filed a motion requesting a referral to the 
presiding Administrative District Judge for a determination as to whether Mr. Colafranceschi 
should be declared a vexatious litigant.  (R. at 61.)  Mr. Colafranceschi filed two objections to 
that motion; one on March 20, 2017, and another on March 29, 2017.  (Id.)  He also filed a 
response on April 12, 2017.  (Id.)  
Judge Moody entered her “Proposed Findings and Notice of Intent to Issue a Prefiling 
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Order” on April 19, 2017.  (R. at 61-69.)  Her proposed findings state that Mr. Colafranceschi’s 
conduct satisfied three of the four bases upon which a person might be declared a vexatious 
litigant under Rule 59(d).  (R. at 62-63 ¶¶ A, B, C making findings under 59(d)(1), (2) and (3), 
respectively).  
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(1) because he had commenced, prosecuted or maintained three 
litigations in the past seven years pro se that had been decided against him.  (R. at 62 (citing 
Colafranceschi v. Schoonover, Valley County case no. CV 2010-312-C; Colafranceschi v. 
Boomer, Valley County Case No. CV 2012-375-C; and citing Colafranceschi v. Briley, Valley 
County Case No. CV 2012-376-C)).  
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(2) because he had made meritless attempts to re-litigate 
adverse outcomes in two cases.  (R. at 63 (citing Colafranceschi v. Schoonover, Valley County 
Case No. CV 2010-312-C (finding that Mr. Colafranceschi’s second motion to set aside a final 
judgment and his subsequent appeal was frivolous); citing Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley 
County Case No. CV 2016-125-C (finding that motion to reconsider divorce decree was an 
attempt to reargue issues previously decided, and that motion to set aside judgment was 
frivolous)).   
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(3) because he had submitted needlessly burdensome discovery 
requests for information that were both irrelevant and deliberately targeted an extremely personal 
and delicate subject matter, and then filed motions to compel responses to those requests.  (R. at 
63 (citing Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley County Case No. CV 2016-125-C in which Mr. 
Colafranceschi propounded 380 discovery requests, some of which sought information related to 
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his ex-wife’s sexual history and whether she had been raped, and filed several motions to compel 
at least one of which was denied in its entirety)). 
Mr. Colafranceschi filed a written objection to Judge Moody’s proposed findings on May 
1, 2017 in a document entitled “Administrative Court: Response and Affidavit to Proposed 
Findings and Notice of Intent to Issue a Prefiling Order.”  (R. at 253-72.)  In that written objection, 
Mr. Colafranceschi requested that the proposed prefiling order be dismissed, or in the alternative 
that he be permitted to present evidence to counter the proposed findings.  (R. at 271.) 
Judge Moody entered an order on June 12, 2017, granting Mr. Colafranceschi’s request to 
present evidence in support of his objections to her findings.  (R. at 308.)  She set a hearing 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), and Mr. Colafranceschi submitted exhibits (see R. at 311 (“Administrative 
Court: Notice of Exhibits”)) and subpoenaed witnesses in advance of hearing (R. at 359-60 
(“Subpoena for Hearing”)).  
The hearing was held on August 7, 2017.  (R. at 380.)  At the hearing, Mr. Colafranceschi 
claimed for the first time that he had contacted attorneys prior to filing lawsuits identified by 
Judge Moody in her proposed findings, and that he had been told by those attorneys that the 
lawsuits had merit.  (Id.)  Given these claims, Judge Moody gave Mr. Colafranceschi until 
September 7, 2017 to submit written evidence substantiating these claims, at which point she 
would take the matter under advisement before entering a decision.  (R. at 381.)  On September 
12, 2017, Judge Moody extended that deadline to October 15, 2017.  (R. at 434.) 
Mr. Colafranceschi submitted affidavits from Curt McKenzie, Carol Griffith, Sam 
Johnson, Nate Peterson, Terri Melcher, and two from himself.  (R. at 452.)  After considering 
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these materials, on November 6, 2017, Judge Moody entered an order declaring Mr. 
Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant (R. at 451-57) and a prefiling order prohibiting Mr. 
Colafranceschi from filing any new civil actions in Idaho courts pro se without first obtaining 
leave of court where the litigation is proposed to be filed (R. at 459). 
Citing the affidavits submitted by Mr. Colafranceschi after the August 7th hearing, Judge 
Moody’s order dismissed the findings in her proposed prefiling order under Rule 59(d)(1) and 
(2).  (R. at 451-56.)  She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(1) because the affidavit of Terri 
Melcher suggested Mr. Colafranceschi had been told by an attorney prior to filing one of the three 
cases cited that it had merit.  (R. at 454.)  She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(2) because in 
one of the two cases cited Justice Schroeder wrote that it was not unreasonable for Mr. 
Colafranceschi to retry issues related to the custody determination.  (R. at 456.)  However, “no 
evidence or argument” altered her conclusion with respect to her proposed finding under 59(d)(3).  
(R. at 456-57.)  Therefore, she adopted that proposed finding and declared Mr. Colafranceschi to 
be a vexatious litigant.  (Id. at 457.) 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did Judge Moody abuse her discretion when she found Mr. Colafranceschi to be a 
vexatious litigant and entered an order requiring him to comply with pre-filing conditions before 
commencing future litigation in Idaho courts pro se? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Proceedings governing vexatious litigants must comply with Idaho Court Administrative 
Rule 59.  See Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59.  A person found to be a vexatious litigant by an 
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administrative district judge may appeal the order to the Idaho Supreme Court as a matter of right.  
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(f).  Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 52(a).  An administrative judge’s vexatious litigant determination is a matter within 
that judge’s discretion and is, therefore, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Telford 
v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 610, 301 P.3d 264, 268 (2013) (holding “Rule 59 uses discretionary 
language: ‘An administrative judge may find a person to be a vexatious litigant . . . .’ Therefore, 
we hold that an abuse of discretion standard applies on review.” (Citation omitted.)).  The test for 
determining whether Judge Moody abused her discretion is (1) whether she rightly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether she acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether she reached her decision through an 
exercise of reason.  Id. (citing Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 179, 219 P.3d 1192, 1195 
(2009)). 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. Judge Moody correctly perceived the issue of whether to declare Mr. Colafranceschi 
to be a vexatious litigant as one of discretion. 
 
A successful challenge of a lower court ruling on the grounds that the judge did not 
recognize the issue as one of discretion typically requires a showing that the court mistakenly 
believed it was constrained in a way that caused it to enter the particular decision in question.  For 
example, in 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, the appellant successfully challenged a decision by 
the City of Boise affirming a grant of a conditional use permit issued by the local Planning and 
Zoning Commission that did not impose parking requirements as a condition of approval beyond 
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those established by the local Parking Chapter.  158 Idaho 12, 15, 343 P.3d 41, 44 (2015).  The 
City’s decision as well as the subsequent district court decision upholding it were reversed.  Id., 
158 Idaho at 20, 343 P.3d at 49.  The record indicated the City and the district court failed to 
recognize that statute authorized the commission to impose parking requirements beyond the 
minimum amount established by the local Parking Chapter.  Id., 158 Idaho at 17-18, 343 P.3d at 
46-47.  The City incorrectly believed it was constrained in a way that it was not and therefore 
failed to recognize the issue to be decided as one of discretion.  Id. 
 Here, there is no evidence that Judge Moody believed her hand was forced or that a 
vexatious litigant determination was mandatory.  In fact, the record strongly indicates Judge 
Moody would not have made the vexatious litigant determination if she had reason to believe the 
evidence did not support it.  Judge Moody initially found Mr. Colafranceschi had engaged in 
conduct that satisfied three of the four categories under Rule 59(d), and then vacated two of three 
findings after weighing evidence presented at hearing and “construing every possible inference 
in favor of Mr. Colafranceschi’s position.”  (R. at 455.)  She also made clear that she recognized 
“it is a serious matter to be declared a vexatious litigant” and for that reason she was giving “Mr. 
Colafranceschi every benefit of the doubt.”  (R. at 454-55.)  If she had believed the circumstances 
did not warrant a finding under 59(d)(3), she would have dismissed that proposed finding just as 
she did with her findings under 59(d)(1) and (2). 
There is nothing in the record that indicates Judge Moody made her determination because 
she believed she was constrained in some way, or because she misinterpreted the legal standard 
to be applied.  Her analysis indicates she recognized that a vexatious litigant determination is 
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discretionary and that she properly exercised discretion when making her determination.  
2. Judge Moody acted within the outer boundaries of her discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards. 
 
Reversal of a lower court decision based on this prong of the abuse of discretion analysis 
is typically based on a finding that the judge either failed to apply or incorrectly applied an 
essential component of the applicable legal test.  See 917 Lusk, LLC, 158 Idaho at 17-18, 343 P.3d 
at 46-47; see also State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 635, 977 P.2d 890, 897 (1999).  The 
boundaries of an administrative judge’s discretion and the legal standards applicable to a 
vexatious litigant determination are set forth in Rule 59.  Subsection (d) permits the entry of a 
prefiling order if the judge makes a finding that the person subject to the order has engaged in any 
one of four types of conduct.  Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d).  Judge Moody determined Mr. 
Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant based on her finding that his conduct satisfied section 
59(d)(3).  (R. 456-57.)  Under 59(d)(3): 
(d) An administrative judge may find a person to be a vexatious litigant based on a 
finding that a person has done any of the following: 
 
(3) In any litigation while acting pro se, repeatedly files unmeritorious 
motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or 
engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay. 
 
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).  
 Judge Moody’s finding was as follows: 
Mr. Colafranceschi has engaged in a pattern of conducting frivolous discovery, or 
discovery solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, in the following cases[:] 
 
1. Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley County case no. CV 2016-125-C.  In a 
divorce case, Mr. Colafranceschi propounded over 380 discovery requests, 
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including 337 requests for admission. These requests included asking 
Petitioner to describe the nature and duration of her affairs with other 
married men in the last ten years and to admit that another man had raped 
her.  Aff. of Scot Ludwig Ex. 8, at 3, 6.  The court concluded that many of 
these requests were irrelevant.  Mr. Colafranceschi filed several motions to 
compel responses to his discovery requests, at least one of which was denied 
in its entirety.  Order Den. Mot. to Compel, Oct. 6, 2016. 
 
(R. at 456.) 
This conduct falls squarely within Rule 59(d)(3).  Mr. Colafranceschi “conduct[ed] 
unnecessary discovery” by submitting a needlessly burdensome volume of requests for 
information that was both irrelevant and deliberately targeted an extremely personal and delicate 
subject matter.  The nature and volume of the requests suggest they were submitted for the purpose 
of harassment and employed as a “tactic” that was “frivolous” or otherwise “solely intended to 
cause unnecessary delay.”  The filing of multiple motions to compel, at least one of which was 
found to be entirely frivolous, to recover information in response to irrelevant, needlessly 
burdensome discovery requests about a person’s sexual history or past history of sexual abuse, 
supports a finding that Mr. Colafranceschi also “repeatedly fil[ed] unmeritorious motions.”  The 
plain language of Rule 59(d)(3) permits a vexatious litigant determination based on a finding that 
a litigant has engaged in this type of conduct.    
 Mr. Colafranceschi argues Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles when she 
made this finding because the Valley County case cited had not been finally determined when 
Judge Moody made her vexatious litigant determination.  (Appellants’ Br. at 14-15.)  Rule 
59(d)(3) requires only that the litigant engage in certain proscribed behavior “[i]n any litigation 
while acting pro se. . . .”  It does not require the litigation to be finally determined in order for the 
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litigant’s conduct to be considered.  Mr. Colafranceschi appears to be conflating section (d)(3) 
with section (d)(2), which relates to attempts to re-litigate cases that have been “finally 
determined.”  Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(2)(A) & (B).  However, section (d) permits a vexatious 
litigant determination based on a finding of “any” of the categories of conduct.  Judge Moody 
was not required to make an additional finding under 59(d)(2). 
 Mr. Colafranceschi claims Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles because her 
finding was based on conduct in one case rather than multiple.  (Appellant’s Br. at 20.)  Again, 
the plain language of 59(d)(3) permits a vexatious litigant determination based on a finding that 
a litigant has engaged in certain conduct “[i]n any litigation while acting pro se”; it does not 
require a finding based on conduct in multiple cases.  Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).  Engaging in 
conduct proscribed by the Rule in multiple cases may bolster support for an administrative judge’s 
determination, but its absence does not bar a vexatious litigant determination under Rule 59.  
  Mr. Colafranceschi claims Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles because her 
finding was based on one set of discovery.  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  The number of sets of requests 
a litigant submits is arbitrary and inapposite.  Mr. Colafranceschi’s “set” of requests included 380 
requests.  More to the point, the language of 59(d)(3) does not require abuse of the discovery 
process through the use of multiple sets of discovery.  It requires a litigant to either (1) conduct 
“unnecessary discovery,” (2) to “repeatedly file[] unmeritorious motions,” or (3) to “engage in 
other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay.”  Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).  
Judge Moody found that Mr. Colafranceschi had conducted unnecessary discovery, much of 
which was frivolous, and that he had filed “several” motions to compel answers to that discovery, 
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“at least one of which was denied in its entirety.”  (R. at 456.)  The Rule requires nothing more. 
 Mr. Colafranceschi argues Judge Moody failed to comply with applicable legal standards 
because her order does not apply two of the four factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in its review 
of a vexatious litigant order in the case of De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990).  
(Appellant’s Br. at 25-26 (citing De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48).)  De Long is a federal circuit 
court case that does not analyze Idaho’s vexatious litigant rule and is therefore inapplicable.  It is 
also readily distinguishable.  
 In De Long, the litigant received no opportunity to oppose the vexatious litigant order 
before it was entered.  912 F.2d at 1147.  
o It is undisputed that Mr. Colafranceschi presented evidence and argument 
challenging the prefiling order before it was filed.  (See R. at 311, 380-81, 434, 
452.) 
 In De Long, the district court failed to identify which filings of cases or motions supported 
its determination.  912 F.2d at 1148. 
o Judge Moody identified the case in which the unnecessary discovery and 
associated motions to compel were filed.  (R. at 456.) 
 In De Long, the district court made “no finding that De Long’s claims were frivolous.”  
912 F.2d at 1148. 
o Here, Judge Moody found that the discovery and subsequent motions to compel 
filed by Mr. Colafranceschi in Valley County Case No. CV-2016-125-C were 
frivolous.  (R. at 456.) 
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 Finally, in De Long Court determined the vexatious litigant order was not properly 
tailored.  912 F.2d at 1148.  Rule 59 contains no tailoring requirement.  
o The prohibitions that may be contained in a prefiling order are specific.  Permitted 
restrictions include “enter[ing] a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant 
from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state pro se without first 
obtaining leave of a judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed” 
and penalizing “[d]isobedience of a prefiling order entered” with contempt of court 
or dismissal.  Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(g), (h), (j).  In light of the specific language 
of the Rule 59, the tailoring of restrictions Mr. Colafranceschi calls for could be 
construed as an impermissible application of legal principles and an abuse of 
discretion.  
3. Judge Moody determined Mr. Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant through an 
exercise of reason. 
 
“The role of this Court, in determining if the district court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason, is to review the process the district court engaged in to make its decision.”  
Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 801-02, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062-63 (2003) (citing Sheridan v. St. 
Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88, 94 (2001)).  The district court must 
“disclose its reasoning” unless its reasoning is obvious from the record.  Id., 138 Idaho at 802, 69 
P.3d at 1063 (citation omitted). 
Judge Moody demonstrated in her order declaring Mr. Colafranceschi to be a vexatious 
litigant that her determination was based on a careful consideration of the relevant factual 
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circumstances and legal principles.  On the issue of whether Mr. Colafranceschi satisfied one of 
the four types of conduct prohibited by section (d), Judge Moody specifically recounted reasons 
why evidence presented at hearing cast the findings in the proposed prefiling order related to 
59(d)(1) and (2) “in a different light.”  (R. at 452-56.)  She considered evidence presented by Mr. 
Colafranceschi in response to the findings in the proposed prefiling order and dismissed the 
findings in her proposed prefiling order under Rule 59(d)(1) and (2) after considering the evidence 
presented.  (R. at 451-56.)  She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(1) because the affidavit of 
Terri Melcher suggested Mr. Colafranceschi had been told by an attorney prior to filing one of 
the three cases cited that it had merit.  (R. at 454.)  She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(2) 
because in one of the two cases cited Justice Schroeder wrote that it was not unreasonable for Mr. 
Colafranceschi to retry issues related to the custody determination.  (R. at 456.) 
As a result, Judge Moody clarified that she did not rely on those findings in making her 
final determination.  (Id.)  She then differentiated subsection (3) and made clear that unlike 
subsections (1) and (2), there was no evidence or argument presented at hearing that “alters the 
Court’s conclusion” with respect to her finding that Mr. Colafranceschi had engaged in conduct 
proscribed by that section of 59(d).  (R. 456-57.)  The change in findings from the proposed 
prefiling order to the one ultimately entered shows that Judge Moody carefully considered the 
evidence presented and reached her conclusion through the exercise of reason. 
Mr. Colafranceschi argues that Judge Moody failed to reach her decision through an 
exercise of reason because pro se litigants labeled vexatious in other states have engaged in more 
egregious conduct.  (See Appellant’s Br. 20-21.)  He compares this case to cases in other states in 
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which “litigants have filed dozens of motions either during the pendency of an action or relating 
to the same judgment.”  (Id. (citing Bravo v. Ismaj, 99 Cal. App. 4th 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).  Identifying dozens of frivolous motions is not required by Rule 59.  
Mr. Colafranceschi fails to explain how more egregious behavior by litigants in other states shows 
that Judge Moody abused her discretion when she made her vexatious litigant determination in 
this case.  Judge Moody applied the relevant Rule as written and Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct 
satisfies the Rule’s plain language.   
Throughout his briefing, Mr. Colafranceschi tries to establish that Judge Moody failed to 
reach her decision through an exercise of reason by re-litigating various facts or arguing that 
Judge Moody weighed evidence incorrectly or purportedly did not consider certain evidence.  He 
argues Judge Moody abused her discretion because she purportedly failed to consider statements 
by Ms. Neustadt about the amount of money Ms. Neustadt is willing to spend on legal 
representation in litigation with Mr. Colafranceschi.  (Appellant’s Br. at 21.)  He argues that 
questions in discovery asking Ms. Neustadt to describe the nature and duration of purported 
affairs with other married men in the preceding ten years and to admit that another man had raped 
her were “reasonable and necessary based upon [Ms. Neustadt’s] own claim that she would harm 
[Mr. Colafranceschi] by making [a] false allegation of PTSD.”  (Id. at 17.)  He lists 27 “false 
allegations and bad acts” allegedly committed by Ms. Neustadt that Judge Moody purportedly 
failed to consider.  (Id. at 11-12.)  He claims Judge Moody inappropriately gave weight to the 
contents of a written statement by Carl Miller related to his use of the judicial process to harass 
witnesses.  (Id. at 6-7.)  He claims Judge Moody incorrectly perceived Ms. Neustadt’s distress 
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based on her courtroom demeanor.  (Id. at 8.)  He argues Judge Moody’s determination should be 
reversed in light of the contents of a list of documents that have been created since the prefiling 
order was entered.  (Id. at 13-14.) 
This type of challenge to Judge Moody’s factual findings does not establish an abuse of 
discretion.  On appeal, the Court “will not substitute [its] view of the facts for the view of the 
district court.”  Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017) (quoting Marshall v. 
Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997)).  “In view of this role, the trial court’s 
findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered.”  Id. (quoting Sun 
Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118-119, 794 P.2d 1389, 
1391-92 (1990)).  Rule 59 lays out the standard to be applied when making a vexatious litigant 
determination and the Rule contains no mention of some type of mandatory weighing or balancing 
the administrative judge must conduct.  Judge Moody found that Mr. Colafranceschi engaged in 
conduct prohibited by Rule 59.  How she weighed the evidence before her in reaching that 
determination is not a basis to overturn it.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this appeal appears to be Mr. Colafranceschi’s belief that the entry of a 
prefiling order is too serious a consequence for his behavior.  While Mr. Colafranceschi might 
consider the outcome unfair, Judge Moody did not abuse her discretion is reaching it.  Mr. 
Colafranceschi’s issue is not actually with how Judge Moody applied Rule 59, but with the 
language of Rule 59 itself.  His appeal to this Court boils down to one question: How can there 
be a Rule that allows the entry of a prefiling order in a case such as this?  But that is not the 
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question to be decided in this appeal.  The question to be decided is whether Judge Moody abused 
her discretion when she applied the Rule as written to Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct.  Based on 
the foregoing, the answer is clearly “No.”  For these reasons, the State requests that the Court 
affirm the Prefiling Order entered by Judge Moody in this case. 
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